Archive
Christmas books for 2009
I thought it would be useful to list the books that gripped me one way or another this year (and may be last year since I don’t usually track such things closely); perhaps they will give you some ideas to add to your Christmas present wish list (please make your own suggestions in the Comments). Most of the books were published a few years ago, I maintain piles of books ordered by when I plan to read them and books migrate between piles until eventually read. Looking at the list I don’t seem to have read many good books this year, perhaps I am spending too much time reading blogs.
These books contain plenty of facts backed up by numbers and an analytic approach and are ordered by physical size.
The New Science of Strong Materials by J. E. Gordon. Ideal for train journeys since it is a small book that can be read in small chunks and is not too taxing. Offers lots of insight into those properties of various materials that are needed to build things (‘new’ here means postwar).
Europe at War 1939-1945 by Norman Davies. A fascinating analysis of the war from a numbers perspective. It is hard to escape the conclusion that in the grand scheme of things us plucky Brits made a rather small contribution, although subsequent Hollywood output has suggested otherwise. Also a contender for a train book.
Japanese English language and culture contact by James Stanlaw. If you are into Japanese culture you will love this, otherwise avoid.
Evolutionary Dynamics by Martin A. Nowak. For the more mathematical folk and plenty of thought power needed. Some very powerful general results from simple processes.
Analytic Combinatorics by Philippe Flajolet and Robert Sedgewick. Probably the toughest mathematical book I have kept at (yet to get close to the end) in a few years. If number sequences fascinate you then give it a try (a pdf is available).
Probability and Computing by Michael Mitzenmacher and Eli Upfal. For the more mathematical folk and plenty of thought power needed. Don’t let the density of Theorems put you off, the approach is broad brush. Plenty of interesting results with applications to solving problems using algorithms containing a randomizing component.
Network Algorithmics by George Varghese. A real hackers book. Not so much a book about algorithms used to solve networking problems but a book about making engineering trade-offs and using every ounce of computing functionality to solve problems having severe resource and real-time constraints.
Virtual Machines by James E. Smith and Ravi Nair. Everything you every wanted to know about virtual machines and more.
Biological Psychology by James W. Kalat. This might be a coffee table book for scientists. Great illustrations, concise explanations, the nuts and bolts of how our bodies runs at the protein/DNA level.
Software maintenance via genetic programming
Genetic algorithms have been used to find solution to a wide variety of problems, including compiler optimizations. It was only a matter of time before somebody applied these techniques to fixing faults in source code.
When I first skimmed the paper “A Genetic Programming Approach to Automated Software Repair” I was surprised at how successful the genetic algorithm was, using as it did such a relatively small amount of cpu resources. A more careful reading of the paper located one very useful technique for reducing the size of the search space; the automated software repair system started by profiling the code to find out which parts of it were executed by the test cases and only considered statements that were executed by these tests for mutation operations (they give a much higher weighting to statements only executed by the failing test case than to statements executed by the other tests; I am a bit surprised that this weighting difference is worthwhile). I hate to think of the amount of time I have wasted trying to fix a bug by looking at code that was not executed by the test case I was running.
I learned more about this very interesting system from one of the authors when he gave the keynote at a workshop organized by people associated with a source code analysis group I was a member of.
The search space was further constrained by only performing mutations at the statement level (i.e., expressions and declarations were not touched) and restricting the set of candidate statements for insertion into the code to those statements already contained within the code, such as if (x != NULL) (i.e., new statements were not randomly created and existing statements were not modified in any way). As measurements of existing code show most uses of a construct are covered by a few simple cases and most statements are constructed from a small number of commonly used constructs. It is no surprise that restricting the candidate insertion set to existing code works so well. Of course no fault fix that depends on using a statement not contained within the source will ever be found.
There is ongoing work looking at genetic modifications at the expression level. This
work shares a problem with GA driven test coverage algorithms; how to find ‘magic numbers’ (in the case of test coverage the magic numbers are those that will cause a controlling expression to be true or false). Literals in source code, like those on the web, tend to follow a power’ish law but the fit to Benford’s law is not good.
Once mutated source that correctly processes the previously failing test case, plus continuing to pass the other test cases, has been generated the code is passed to the final phase of the automated software repair system. Many mutations have no effect on program behavior (the DNA term intron is sometimes applied to them) and the final phase removes any of the added statements that have no effect on test suite output (Westley Weimer said that a reduction from 50 statements to 10 statements is common).
Might the ideas behind this very interesting research system end up being used in ‘live’ software? I think so. There are systems that operate 24/7 where faults cost money. One can imagine a fault being encountered late at night, a genetic based system fixing the fault which then updates the live system, the human developers being informed and deciding what to do later. It does not take much imagination to see the cost advantages driving expensive human input out of the loop in some cases.
An on-going research topic is the extent to which a good quality test suite is needed to ensure that mutated fault fixes don’t introduce new faults. Human written software is known to often be remarkably tolerant to the presence of faults. Perhaps ensuring that software has this characteristic is something that should be investigated.
Where are the dead bodies?
The possibility of faults in software causing death or serious injury is often talked about and in some cases large amounts of money are invested in work to reduce the possibility of these events occurring (or at least doing things that will support the view that a company took reasonable precautions, should a case end up in court). The Therac-25 accidents are an often quoted example of a software fault that directly resulted in deaths. These accidents occurred over a 19 month period in the mid 1980s and are believed to have resulted in the death of six people. I don’t wish to disrespect the memory of the people who died, but six people 20 years ago; is that it? Less than the number of people killed every day (around 10) in traffic accidents in the UK.
If faults in software really do have a non-trivial impact on human safety then we would expect this fact to be reflected in accident statistics. After searching the accident statistics for the UK I cannot find any whose cause is directly attributed to software. If there are people who have died as a direct result of faults in software, the death rate has not yet reached the minimum level needed to be recorded as such (or are these deaths ‘hidden’ away in ones and twos within other causes?)
The US National Transportation Safety Board carries out a thorough investigation of all US aviation accidents. Searching the Aviation Accident Database on the query “software” between the dates 1 Jan 2000 and 9 Aug 2005 returns 44 matches. Reading these 44 reports I did not find any accident attributed to a software related issue.
If faults in software are not killing or seriously injuring many people why is so much effort invested in reducing the probability of these events occurring? The following are some of the possibilities:
- The investment actually made is small, but it is talked up.
- The investment is made for economic reasons (e.g., more reliable products are likely to reduce support costs) and increased ’safety’ is a side effect.
- In situations where there is a likelihood of death or serious injury the procedures and reliability of non-software items is sufficient to short-circuit the effects of any life threatening faults that may exist in the software used (at least until the fault can be corrected).
As any developer knows, replicating faulty behavior in software can be very difficult, if not impossible. It may be that software faults are not given as the root cause of death or serious injury because the necessary proof is not available. Or perhaps software faults have yet to be the root cause of such events on any non-trivial scale.
Existing practice affects what people are willing to put up with. Many users of Microsoft Windows now accept that it is necessary to reboot the computer they are using on a daily, or even hourly, basis. Users of cars accept that the tool they are using can result in serious injuries or even death (usually rating nothing more than a story in the local town newspaper). Will there be a public hue and cry once software faults start to be recorded as a primary factor in accidental death or serious injury? As this paper shows, it can take a lot of dead bodies before existing practices are changed.
The lack of dead bodies attributed to a software root cause suggests that it is very still early days for the field of high integrity software development.
This material was originally written in 2005 and appeared in an earlier blog of mine which I did not keep up.
sizeof i++
It is quite common for coding guideline documents to contain at least one guideline recommending against the use of a construct that developers very rarely use, for instance: “The operand of the sizeof operator shall not contain side-effects.”
... sizeof i++; // Is the author expecting i to be incremented? |
Why do such recommendations get incorporated into guideline documents? The obvious answer is that their author(s) are unaware of actual developer usage and believe the recommendation has value.
I have heard people claim that such recommendations are harmless, after all the adherence cost is minimal. Besides, the fact that code very likely already adheres to it will increase the “pass” rate for the set of guidelines the first time developers check their code. However, such guidelines unjustifiably increase peoples confidence in software (as measured by the number of guidelines adhered to). They not only fail to add value to a set of coding guidelines, but their presence could result in the probity of the other guidelines being questioned.
I continue to be surprised by the amount of resistance encountered by my attempts to have the “sizeof” guideline removed from, or not included in, a set of coding guidelines. In the case of an existing set of guidelines there is obviously a resistance to change, but I have not yet managed to extract a single promise to consider removing the guideline in a future revision.
People seem unimpressed by the amount of source code I have searched in a vain attempt to find a violation of the “sizeof” guideline, but they often have some vague memory of having seen an instance of this elusive usage. My questions asking after the name of the source file, the name of the program, the name of the project, or simply the name of the company they were working for at the time are greeted with uncertainty. Perhaps the only instance they have seen is in the example underneath the text of the recommendation? Growls and pointed looks.
Another factor is existing practice, if it appears in other guideline documents it must have some benefit. People don’t want to go out on a limb. Besides, basing decisions on measurement of source code, who does that these days?
Whatever else might be said about the “sizeof” guideline, it does make a great example that developers can use to regale management.
Superior tone: Less experienced developers
Earnest voice: don’t always have a complete understanding of C/C++
Shock: They make the mistake of thinking
Talking very fast: that the code sizeof i++
Incredulity: will cause i to be incremented!
Emphasis: This guideline
Relieved voice: ensures that this mistake os warned about.
This article originally appeared in an earlier blog of mine which I did not keep up.
Compiler writing: The career path to World domination
Compiler writing is not usually thought of as a career path that leads to becoming Ruler of the World. Perhaps this is because compiler writing is a relatively new profession and us compiler writers are still toiling in obscurity awaiting the new dawn.
What might be a workable plan for a compiler writer to become Ruler of the World? One possibility is to write a compiler for the language in which most of the World’s critical software is written (i.e., C) and for that compiler to become the one that the vendors of this critical software all use (i.e., gcc). This compiler needs to do more that just compile the source code it is feed, it also needs to generate code that creates a backdoor in important programs (e.g., the login program).
But, you say, this cannot happen with gcc because its source is available for everybody to read (and spot any backdoor generator). In his 1984 Turing acceptance lecture Ken Thompson showed how a compiler could contain a backdoor that was not visible in its source. The idea is for the compiler writer to modify a compiler to detect when it is being used to compile itself and to insert the backdoor generating code into its own executable. This modified compiler is then used to compile itself and the resulting executable made the default compiler; the backdoor modifications are then removed from the compiler source, they are no longer needed because the previously compiled compiler will spot when it is being used to compile its own source and generate the code necessary to propagate the backdoor code into the executable it creates.
How would the world counter the appearance of such a modified gcc? Obviously critical programs would need to be recompiled by a version of gcc that did not contain the backdoor. Today there are several companies and many amateur groups that distribute their own Linux distributions which they build from source. It should be relatively easy to obtain a usable executable of gcc from 10 years ago; remember what is needed is a version capable of compiling the latest gcc sources.
The ideal time to create a backdoor’ed version of gcc is while its development was under the control of one person, so early in the development history that all versions available anywhere are very likely to be derived from it. How can we prove that the original author of gcc did not do just this?
It could be argued that the very substantial changes to the gcc sources (most of the source has probably been rewritten several times) mean that the coding patterns searched for by the executable to detect that it is compiling itself have long gone and at some point the backdoor failed to propagate itself to the next executable.
Compilers other than gcc might also include backdoors that propagate themselves. However, the method of propagation is likely to be different. Compiling the gcc sources with a non-gcc compiler creates an executable that should exhibit the same behavior as a gcc-compiled executable. Differences in the behavior of these independently built executables is a cause for concern (one difference might be caused by differences in the conversion of floating-point literals, a recent PhD thesis provides more detail).
The problem with compiling the gcc sources is that they make use of language extensions that few, if any, other compilers support. I know IBM added modified one of their C compilers to support those gcc extensions needed to compile the Linux kernel, but I don’t know if this compiler is capable of compiling the gcc sources. The LLVM project intended to support many gcc extensions but I don’t know if they aim to be able to compile the gcc sources.
Another option is to compare the assembler generated when gcc compiles itself against the corresponding source code. A very expensive task for source code measured in hundreds of thousands of lines. Adding the necessary language extension support to another compiler would probably be cheaper and also create a tool that could be used to check future releases of gcc.
CPUs also exhibit hardware faults
The cpu is the one element of a computing platform that people rarely treat as a source of error caused by physically malfunction, i.e., randomly flipping a bit in a register or instruction pipeline. I once worked on a compiler for the Mototola 88000 using a test platform that contained alpha silicon (i.e., not yet saleable components where some of the instructions were known not to work; the generated assembler code was piped through a sed script that mapped these instructions into an alternative instruction sequence that did work) and the cpus in a few of the hardware updates turned out to be temperature sensitive; some of the instructions changed their behavior when they got too hot. People who write compilers using alpha silicon learn to expect this sort of thing.
Quite a bit has been published on faults in other hardware components. Some of the best recent empirical hardware fault data and analysis I have seen is that published by Google engineers on hard disc and dram memory fault occurrences in their server farms. They might have a problem publishing such results for the cpus they use because these commodity items generally don’t have the ability to report any detailed fault data, they just die or one of the programs being executed crashes.
As device fabrication continues to shrink erroneous behavior caused by cosmic ray impact will become more and more common. Housing a computer farm at a high altitude might not be a good idea (at 7500 ft cosmic ray-induced neutrons that can lead to soft errors are 6.4 times more common than at sea level).
IBM’s Power4 chip (“Power4 System Design for High Reliability” by Bossen, Tendler and Reick) is one of the few that provides error checking of cache contents, while IBM’s System z9 is one of the very few that provide parity checking on the cpu registers (“Enhanced I/O subsystem recovery and availability on the IBM System z9” by Oakes et al).
One solution to the problem of unreliable cpu behavior is for the compiler to insert consistency checks into the generated code. Two such checking methods are:
- ‘Signature Analysis’ which performs consistency checks between signatures calculated at compile time and runtime. A signature is associated with every basic block with the current signature being derived from the execution history. This technique can detect spurious changes to the flow of control caused by a hardware glitch.
- ‘Error Detection by Duplicated Instructions’ generates code which duplicates the behavior of some instruction sequence and compares the result calculated by both sequences, i.e., a source language construct is executed twice and an error raised if the results are different. The parallel instruction sequences use different sets of registers on the same cpu and ideally the instructions are scheduled to exploit instruction level parallelism
At the moment cosmic-ray induced hardware faults are probably very small change compared to faults in the code. Will code quality increase to the point where cosmic-ray faults become an issue or will devices get so small that they have to be lead lined to prevent background radiation corrupting them? Let the race begin.
Estimating variance when measuring source
Yesterday I finally delivered a paper on if/switch usage measurements to the ACCU magazine editor and today I read about a switch statement usage that, if common, would invalidate a chunk of my results. Does anything jump out at you in the following snippet?
switch (x) { case 1: { z++; ... break; } ... |
Yes, those { } delimiting the case-labeled statement sequence. A quick check of my C source benchmarks showed this usage occurring in around 1% of case-labels. Panic over.
What is the statistical significance, i.e., variance, of that 1%? Have I simply measured an unrepresentative sample, what would be a representative sample and what would be the expected variance within a representative sample?
I am interested in commercial software development, and so I have selected half a dozen or so largish code bases as my source benchmark, preferably written in a commercial environment even if currently available as Open source. I would prefer this benchmark to be an order of magnitude larger, and perhaps I will get around to adding more programs soon.
My if/switch measurements were aimed at finding usage characteristics that varied between the two kinds of selection statements. One characteristic measured was the number of equality tests in the associated controlling expression. For instance, in:
if (x == 1 || x == 2) z--; else if (x == 3) z++; |
the first controlling expression contains two equality tests, and the second one equality test.
Plotting the percentage of equality tests that occur in the controlling expressions of if-if/if-else-if sequences and switch statements, we get the following:
Do these results indicate that if-if/if-else-if sequences and switch statements differ in the number of equality tests contained in their controlling expressions? If I measured a completely different set of source code, would the results be very different?
To answer this question, a probability model is needed. Take as an example, the controlling expressions present in an if-if sequence. If each controlling expression is independent of the others, then the probability of two equality tests, for instance, occurring in any of these expressions is constant and thus given a large sample the distribution of two equality tests in the source has a binomial distribution. The same argument can be applied to other numbers of equality tests and other kinds of sequence.
For each measurement point in the above plot the associated error bars span the square-root of the variance of that point (assuming a binomial distribution, for a normal distribution the length of this span is known as the standard deviation). The error bars overlap, suggesting that the apparent difference in percentage of equality tests in each kind of sequence is not statistically significant.
The existence of some dependency between controlling expression equality tests would invalidate this simply analysis, or at least reduce its reliability. I did notice that in a sequence that containing two equality tests, the controlling expression that contained it tended to appear later in the sequence (the reverse of the example given above). Did I notice this because I tend to write this way? A question for another day.
Register vs. stack based VMs
Traditionally the virtual machine architecture of choice has been the stack machine; benefits include simplicity of VM implementation, ease of writing a compiler back-end (most VMs are originally designed to host a single language) and code density (i.e., executables for stack architectures are invariably smaller than executables for register architectures).
For a stack architecture to be an effective solution, two conditions need to be met:
- The generated code has to ensure that the top of stack is kept in sync with where the next instruction expects it to be. For instance, on its return a function cannot leave stuff lying around on the stack like it can leave values in registers (whose contents can simply be overwritten).
- Instruction execution needs to be generally free of state, so an add-two-integers instruction should not have to consult some state variable to find out the size of integers being added. When the value of such state variables have to be saved and restored around function calls, they effectively become VM registers.
Cobol is one language where it makes more sense to use a register based VM. I wrote one and designed two machine code generators for the MicroFocus Cobol VM and always find it difficult to explain to people what a very different kind of beast it is compared to the VMs usually encountered.
Parrot, the VM designed as the target for compiled PERL, is register based. A choice driven, I suspect, by the difficulty of ensuring a consistent top-of-stack and perhaps the dynamic typing of the language.
On register based cpus with 64k of storage, the code density benefits of a stack based VM are usually sufficient to cancel out the storage overhead of the VM interpreter and support a more feature rich application (provided speed of execution is not crucial).
If storage capacity is not a significant issue and a VM has to be used, what are the runtime performance differences between a register and stack based VM? Answering this question requires compiling and executing the same set of applications for the two kinds of VM. Something that until 2001 nobody had done, or at least not published the results.
A comparison of the Java (stack based) VM with a register VM (The Case for Virtual Register Machines) found that while the stack based code was more compact, fewer instructions needed to be executed on the register based VM.
Most VM instructions are very simple and take relatively little time to execute. When hosted on a pipelined processor the main execution time overhead of a VM is the instruction dispatch (Optimizing Indirect Branch Prediction Accuracy in Virtual Machine Interpreters) and reducing the number of VM instructions executed, even if they are larger and more complicated, can produce a worthwhile performance improvement.
Google has chosen a register based VM for its Android platform. While licensing issues may have been a consideration, there are a number of technical advantages to this decision:
- A register VM is likely to have an intrinsic performance advantage over a stack VM when hosted on a pipelined processor.
- Byte code verification is likely to be faster on a register VM (i.e., faster startup times) because stack height integrity checks will be greatly simplified.
- A register VM will be more forgiving of incorrect code (in the VM, generated by the compiler, code corrupted during program transmission or storage attacked by malware) than a stack VM.
Using Coccinelle to match if sequences
I have been using Coccinelle to obtain measurements of various properties of C if and switch statements. It is rare to find a tool that does exactly what is desired, but it is often possible to combine various tools to achieve the desired result.
I am interested in measuring sequences of if-else-if statements and one of the things I wanted to know was how many sequences of a given length occurred. Writing a pattern for each possible sequence was the obvious solution, but what is the longest sequence I should search for? A better solution is to use a pattern that matches short sequences and writes out the position (line/column number) where they occur in the code, as in the following Coccinelle pattern:
@ if_else_if_else @ expression E_1, E_2; statement S_1, S_2, S_3; position p_1, p_2; @@ if@p_1 (E_1) S_1 else if@p_2 (E_2) S_2 else S_3 @ script:python @ expr_1 << if_else_if_else.E_1; expr_2 << if_else_if_else.E_2; loc_1 << if_else_if_else.p_1; loc_2 << if_else_if_else.p_2; @@ print "--- ifelseifelse" print loc_1[0].line, " ", loc_1[0].column, " ", expr_1 print loc_2[0].line, " ", loc_2[0].column, " ", expr_2 |
noting that in a sequence of source such as:
if (x == 1) stmt_1; else if (x == 2) stmt_2; else if (x == 3) stmt_3; |
the tokens if (x == 2) will be matched twice, the first setting the position metavariable p_2 and then setting p_1. An awk script was written to read the Coccinelle output and merge together adjacent pairs of matches that were part of a longer if-else-if sequence.
The first pattern did not concern itself with the form of the controlling expression, it simply wrote it out. A second set of patterns was used to match those forms of controlling expression I was interested in, but first I had to convert the output into syntactically correct C so that it could be processed by Coccinelle. Again awk came to the rescue, converting the output:
--- ifelseifelse 186 2 op == FFEBLD_opSUBRREF 191 7 op == FFEBLD_opFUNCREF --- ifelseifelse 1094 3 anynum && commit 1111 8 ( c [ colon + 1 ] == '*' ) && commit |
into a separate function for each matched sequence:
void f_1(void) { // --- ifelseifelse /* 186 2 */ op == FFEBLD_opSUBRREF ; /* 191 7 */ op == FFEBLD_opFUNCREF ; } void f_2(void) { // --- ifelseifelse /* 1094 3 */ anynum && commit ; /* 1111 8 */ ( c [ colon + 1 ] == '*' ) && commit ; } |
The Coccinelle pattern:
@ if_eq_1 @ expression E_1; constant C_1, C_2; position p_1, p_2; @@ E_1 == C_1@p_1 ; E_1 == C_2@p_2 ; @ script:python @ expr_1<< if_eq_1.E_1; const_1 << if_eq_1.C_1; const_2 << if_eq_1.C_2; loc_1 << if_eq_1.p_1; loc_2 << if_eq_1.p_2; @@ print loc_1[0].line, " ", loc_1[0].column, " 3 ", expr_1, " == ", const_1 print loc_2[0].line, " ", loc_2[0].column, " 2 ", expr_1, " == ", const_2 |
matches a sequence of two statements which consist of an expression being compared for equality against a constant, with the expression being identical in both statements. Again positions were written out for post-processing, i.e., joining together matched sequences.
I was interested in any sequence of if-else-if that could be converted to an equivalent switch-statement. Equality tests against a constant is just one form of controlling expression that meets this requirement, another is the between operation. Separate patterns could be written and run over the generated C source containing the extracted controlling expressions.
Breaking down the measuring process into smaller steps reduced the amount of time needed to get a final result (with Coccinelle 0.1.19 the first pattern takes round 70 minutes, thanks to Julia Lawall‘s work to speed things up, an overhead that only has to occur once) and allows the same controlling expression patterns to be run against the output of both the if-else-if and if-if patterns.
At the end of this process I ended up with a list information (line numbers in source code and form of controlling expression) on if-statement sequences that could be rewritten as a switch-statement.
Does the Climategate code produce reliable output?
The source of several rather important commercial programs have been made public recently, or to be more exact programs whose output is important (i.e., the Sequoia voting system and code and data from the Climate Research Unit at University of East Anglia the so called ‘Climategate’ leak). While many technical commentators have expressed amazement at how amateurish the programming appears to be, apparently written with little knowledge of good software engineering practices or knowledge of the programming language being used, those who work on commercial projects know that low levels of software engineering/programming competence is the norm.
The emails included in the Climategate leak provide another vivid example, if one were needed, of why scientific data should be made publicly available; scientists are human and are sometimes willing to hide data that does not fit their pet theory or even fails to validate their theory at all.
The Climategate source has only only recently become available and existing technical commentary has been derived from embarassing comments and the usual complaint about not using the right programming language (Fortran is actually a good choice of language for this problem, it is widely used by climatology researchers and a non-professional programmer is probably makes best of their time by using the one language they know tolerably well rather than attempting to use a new language that nobody else in the research group knows).
An important quality indicator of the leaked software was what was not there, test cases (at least I could not find any). How do we know that a program’s output is correct? One way to gain some confidence in a program’s correctness is to process data for which the correct output is known. This blindness to the importance of program level correctness testing is something that I often encounter in people who are subject area experts rather than professional programmers; they believe that if the output has the form they are expecting it must be correct and will sometimes add ‘faults’ to ‘fix’ output that deviates from what they are expecting.
A quick visual scan through the source showed a tale of two worlds, one of single letter identifier names and liberal use of goto, and the other of what looks like meaningful names, structured code and a non-trivial number of comments. The individuals who have contributed to the code base obviously have very different levels of coding ability. Not having written any Fortran in anger for over 15 years my ability to estimate the impact of more subtle coding practices has atrophied.
What kind of faults might a code review look for in these programs? Common coding errors such as using uninitialized variables and incorrect argument passing are obvious choices and their are tools available to check for these kinds of error. A much more insidious kind of error, which requires people with the mathematical expertise to spot, is created by the approximate nature of floating-point arithmetic.
The source is not huge, but not small either, consisting of around 64,000 lines of Fortran and 16,000 lines of IDL (a language designed for interactive data analysis which to my untrained eye looks a lot like MATLAB). There was no obvious support for building the source included within the leaked files (e.g., no makefiles) and my attempt to manually compile using the GNU Fortran compiler failed miserably. So I cannot say anything reliable about the compiler output warnings.
To me the complete lack of test cases implies that the Climategate code does not produce reliable output. Comments in the code such as
***** APPLIES A VERY ARTIFICIAL CORRECTION FOR DECLINE*********suggests that the authors were willing to patch the code to produce output that matched their expectations; this is the mentality of somebody for whom code correctness is not an important issue and if they don’t believe their code is correct then I don’t either.Source code in itself is rarely that important, although it might have been expensive to create. The real important information in the leaked files is the climate data. Now that this is available others can apply their analysis skills to provide an interpretation to what, if anything statistically reliable, it is telling us.