Testing rounded data for a circular uniform distribution
Circular statistics deals with analysis of measurements made using a circular scale, e.g., minutes past the hour, days of the week. Wikipedia uses the term directional statistics, the traditional use being measurements of angles, e.g., wind direction.
Package support for circular statistics is rather thin on the ground. R’s circular package is one of the best, and the book “Circular Statistics in R” provides the only best introduction to the subject.
Circular statistics has a few surprises for those new to the subject (apart from a few name changes, e.g., the von Mises distribution is effectively the ‘circular Normal distribution’), including:
- the mean value contains two components, a direction and a length, e.g., mean wind direction and strength,
- there are several definitions of variance, with angular variance having a value between 0 and 2, and circular variance having a value between 0 and 1. The circular standard deviation is not the square root of variance, but rather: , where is the mean length.
The basic techniques used in circular statistics are still relatively new, compared to the more well known basic statistical techniques. For instance, it was recently discovered that having more measurements may reduce the reliability of the Rao spacing test (used to test whether a sample has a uniform circular distribution); generally, having more measurements improves the reliability of a statistical test.
The plot below shows Rose diagrams for the number of commits in each 3-hour period of a day for Linux and FreeBSD (mean direction and length in green; code+data):
The Linux kernel source has far fewer commits at the weekend, compared to working days. Given the number of people whose job is to work on the Linux kernel, compared to the number of people doing it out of interest, this difference is not surprising. The percentage of people working on OpenBSD as a job is small, and there does not appear to be a big difference between weekends and workdays. There is a lot of variation in the number of commits during each 3-hour period of a day, but the number of commits per day does not vary so much; the number of OpenBSD commits per day of week is:
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 26909 26144 25705 25104 24765 22812 24304 |
Does this distribution of commits per day have a uniform distribution (to some confidence level)?
Like all measurements, those made on a circular scale are rounded to some number of digits. Measurements may also be rounded, or binned, to particular units of the scale, e.g., measured to the nearest degree, or nearest minute.
A recent paper, by Landler, Ruxton and Malkemper, found that for samples containing around five hundred or more measurements, rounding to the nearest degree was sufficient to cause the Rao spacing test to almost always report non-uniformity, i.e., for non-trivial samples the rounding was sufficient to cause the test to detect non-uniformity (things worked as expected for samples containing fewer than 100 measurements).
Landler et al found that adding a small amount of noise (drawn from a von Mises distribution) to the rounded measurements appeared to ‘fix’ the incorrect behavior, i.e., rejecting the hypothesis of a uniform distribution, when a uniform distribution may be present.
The rao.spacing.test
function, in the circular package, rejected that null hypothesis that the OpenBSD daily data has a uniform distribution. However, when noise is added to each day value (i.e., adding a random fraction to the day values, using rvonmises(length(c_per_day), circular(0), 2.0)
, although runif(length(c_per_day))
is probably more appropriate {and produces essentially the same result}), the call to rao.spacing.test
failed to reject the null hypothesis of uniformity at the 0.05 level (i.e., the daily distribution is probably uniform).
How many research results are affected by this discovery?
I very rarely encounter the use of circular statistics (even though they should probably have been used in places), but then I spend my time reading software engineering papers, whose use of statistics tends to be primitive. I plan to include a brief mention of the use of the Rao spacing test with binned data in the addendum to my Evidence-based software engineering book (which includes the above example).
Multiple estimates for the same project
The first question I ask, whenever somebody tells me that a project was delivered on schedule (or within budget), is which schedule (or budget)?
New schedules are produced for projects that are behind schedule, and costs get re-estimated.
What patterns of behavior might be expected to appear in a project’s reschedulings?
It is to be expected that as a project progresses, subsequent schedules become successively more accurate (in the sense of having a completion date and cost that is closer to the final values). The term cone of uncertainty is sometimes applied as a visual metaphor in project management, with the schedule becoming less uncertain as the project progresses.
The only publicly available software project rescheduling data, from Landmark Graphics, is for completed projects, i.e., cancelled projects are not included (121 completed projects and 882 estimates).
The traditional project management slide has some accuracy metric improving as work on a project approaches completion. The plot below shows the percentage of a project completed when each estimate is made, against the ratio ; the y-axis uses a log scale so that under/over estimates appear symmetrical (code+data):
The closer a point to the blue line, the more accurate the estimate. The red line shows maximum underestimation, i.e., estimating that the project is complete when there is still more work to be done. A new estimate must be greater than (or equal) to the work already done, i.e., , and .
Rearranging, we get: (plotted in red). The top of the ‘cone’ does not represent managements’ increasing certainty, with project progress, it represents the mathematical upper bound on the possible inaccuracy of an estimate.
In theory there is no limit on overestimating (i.e., points appearing below the blue line), but in practice management are under pressure to deliver as early as possible and to minimise costs. If management believe they have overestimated, they have an incentive to hang onto the time/money allocated (the future is uncertain).
Why does management invest time creating a new schedule?
If information about schedule slippage leaks out, project management looks bad, which creates an incentive to delay rescheduling for as long as possible (i.e., let’s pretend everything will turn out as planned). The Landmark Graphics data comes from an environment where management made weekly reports and estimates were updated whenever the core teams reached consensus (project average was eight times).
The longer a project is being worked on, the greater the opportunity for more unknowns to be discovered and the schedule to slip, i.e., longer projects are expected to acquire more re-estimates. The plot below shows the number of estimates made, for each project, against the initial estimated duration (red/green) and the actual duration (blue/purple); lines are loess fits (code+data):
What might be learned from any patterns appearing in this data?
When presented with data on the sequence of project estimates, my questions revolve around the reasons for spending time creating a new estimate, and the amount of time spent on the estimate.
A lot of time may have been invested in the original estimate, but how much time is invested in subsequent estimates? Are later estimates simply calculated as a percentage increase, a politically acceptable value (to the stakeholder funding for the project), or do they take into account what has been learned so far?
The information needed to answer these answers is not present in the data provided.
However, this evidence of the consistent provision of multiple project estimates drives another nail in to the coffin of estimation research based on project totals (e.g., if data on project estimates is provided, one estimate per project, were all estimates made during the same phase of the project?)
Readability: a scientific approach
Readability, as applied to software development today, is a meaningless marketing term. Readability is promoted as a desirable attribute, and is commonly claimed for favored programming languages, particular styles of programming, or ways of laying out source code.
Whenever somebody I’m talking to, or listening to in a talk, makes a readability claim, I ask what they mean by readability, and how they measured it. The speaker invariably fumbles around for something to say, with some dodging and weaving before admitting that they have not measured readability. There have been a few studies that asked students to rate the readability of source code (no guidance was given about what readability might be).
If somebody wanted to investigate readability from a scientific perspective, how might they go about it?
The best way to make immediate progress is to build on what is already known. There has been over a century of research on eye movement during reading, and two model of eye movement now dominate, i.e., the E-Z Reader model and SWIFT model. Using eye-tracking to study developers is slowly starting to be adopted by researchers.
Our eyes don’t smoothly scan the world in front of us, rather they jump from point to point (these jumps are known as a saccade), remaining fixed long enough to acquire information and calculate where to jump next. The image below is an example from an eye tracking study, where subjects were asking to read a sentence (see figure 770.11). Each red dot appears below the center of each saccade, and the numbers show the fixation time (in milliseconds) for that point (code):
Models of reading are judged by the accuracy of their predictions of saccade landing points (within a given line of text), and fixation time between saccades. Simulators implementing the E-Z Reader and SWIFT models have found that these models have comparable performance, and the robustness of these models are compared by looking at the predictions they make about saccade behavior when reading what might be called unconventional material, e.g., mirrored or scarmbeld text.
What is the connection between the saccades made by readers and their understanding of what they are reading?
Studies have found that fixation duration increases with text difficulty (it is also affected by decreases with word frequency and word predictability).
It has been said that attention is the window through which we perceive the world, and our attention directs what we look at.
A recent study of the SWIFT model found that its predictions of saccade behavior, when reading mirrored or inverted text, agreed well with subject behavior.
I wonder what behavior SWIFT would predict for developers reading a line of code where the identifiers were written in camelCase or using underscores (sometimes known as snake_case)?
If the SWIFT predictions agreed with developer saccade behavior, a raft of further ‘readability’ tests spring to mind. If the SWIFT predictions did not agree with developer behavior, how might the model be updated to support the reading of lines of code?
Until recently, the few researchers using eye tracking to investigate software engineering behavior seemed to be having fun playing with their new toys. Things are starting to settle down, with some researchers starting to pay attention to existing models of reading.
What do I predict will be discovered?
Lots of studies have found that given enough practice, people can become proficient at handling some apparently incomprehensible text layouts. I predict that given enough practice, developers can become equally proficient at most of the code layout schemes that have been proposed.
The important question concerning text layout, is: which one enables an acceptable performance from a wide variety of developers who have had little exposure to it? I suspect the answer will be the one that is closest to the layout they have had the most experience,i.e., prose text.
Cognitive bias or not paying enough attention?
Assume you are responsible for two teams who independently work on projects, say Team A and Team B. The teams have different work completion rates, with Team A completing work at the rate of 70 widgets per week, while Team B completes 30 widgets per week. Both teams always work on projects that require the completion of the same number of widgets.
You have the resources to send just one of the teams on a course. It is predicted that sending Team A on the course would improve their performance to 110 widgets per week, while attending the course would improve the performance of Team B to 40 widgets per week.
Senior management have decreed that time to market is the metric by which project managers are judged.
You want to impress senior management by significantly improving time to market for your projects; which team do you send on the course (i.e., the one that is likely to experience the largest reduction in time to market)?
This question is a restatement of a one involving cars travelling at different speeds, that has grown into a niche research area. Studies have found that a large percentage of subjects give the wrong answer, and they are said to have a time-saving bias, or time-loss bias.
The inability to correctly process “inverse variables” has been given as the reason people tend to give the wrong answer. The term “inverse variables” comes from the formula for calculating completion time, where the velocity appears as the denominator. Another way of looking at this problem is that when going slowly, there is more scope for improvement, compared to when going much faster.
A speed increase from 30 to 40 is only 10, or a 33% improvement; while an increase from 70 to 110 is an increase of 40, or 57%. Based on these numbers, Team A should be sent on the course.
However, we are interested in time to market. Let’s assume that both teams have to complete a project requiring 100 widgets. Before attending the course, Team A completes 100 widgets in 100/70=1.4 weeks, and Team B completes 100 widgets in 100/30=3.3 weeks. After attending the course, Team A would complete 100 widgets in 100/110=0.91 weeks, and Team B would complete 100 widgets in 100/40=2.5 weeks. Time to market for Team A has been reduced by (1.4-0.9)=0.5 weeks, while the reduction for Team B is (3.3-2.5)=0.8 weeks. So sending Team B on the course makes you look better, on the time to market metric.
If somebody ran an experiment with project managers, would the subjects tend to incorrectly process “inverse variables”. Well, somebody has done the experiment, and yes, many subjects exhibited the time-saving bias (the experimental scenario described in the appendix is a lot easier to understand than the one in the main body of the paper, which is a mess; Magne Jørgensen continues to be the only person doing interesting experiments in software estimation).
It has become common practice that, when a large percentage of subjects in a psychology experiment respond in ways that are inconsistent with a mathematical approach, the behavior is labelled as being a bias. I think the use of this terminology makes the behavior sound more interesting than it actually is; what’s wrong with saying that people make mistakes. Perhaps labelling experimental responses as being a bias makes it easier to get papers published.
Whether people are biased, or don’t pay enough attention, when solving non-trivial equations, what might be done about it?
This is not about whether any particular metric is a useful one, rather it is about calculating the right answer for whatever metric happens to be chosen.
Would an awareness campaign highlighting the problems people have with “inverse variables” be worthwhile? I don’t think so. Many people have problems with equations, and I don’t see why this case is more worthy of being highlighted than any other.
Am I missing something?
Psychology researchers are interested in figuring out the functioning of the brain/mind, so they are looking for patterns in the responses subjects give. Once someone has published a few papers on a research topic, they become invested in it. If they continue to get funding, the papers keep on coming. Sometimes a niche topic acquires a major following, and the work contributes to a major change of thinking about the mind, e.g., the Wason selection task helped increase the evidence that culture has an impact on cognitive behavior.
I think that software engineering researchers need to carefully evaluate the likely importance of behaviors that psychology researchers have labelled as a bias.
Actual implementation times are often round numbers
To what extent do developers consciously influence the time taken to actually complete a task?
If the time estimated to complete a task is rather generous, a developer has the opportunity to follow Parkinson’s law (i.e., “work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion”), or if the time is slightly less than appears to be required, they might work harder to finish within the estimated time (like some marathon runners have a target time)?
The use of round numbers are a prominent pattern seen in task estimation times.
If round numbers appeared more often in the actual task completion time than would be expected by chance, it would suggest that developers are sometimes working to a target time. The following plot shows the number of tasks taking a given amount of actual time to complete, for project 615 in the CESAW dataset (similar patterns are present in the actual times of other projects; code+data):
The red lines are a fitted bi-exponential distribution to the ‘spike’ (i.e., round numbers, circled in grey) and non-spike points (spikes automatically selected, see code for details), green and purple lines are the two components of the non-spike fit.
Tasks are not always started and completed in one continuous work session, work may be spread over multiple work sessions; the CESAW data includes the start/end time of every work session associated with each task (85% of tasks involve more than one work session, for project 615). The following plots are based on work sessions, rather than tasks, for tasks worked on over two (left) and three (right) sessions; colored lines denote session ordering within a task (code+data):
Shorter sessions dominate for the last session of task implementation, and spikes in the counts indicate the use of round numbers in all session positions (e.g., 180 minutes, which may be half a day).
Perhaps round number work session times are a consequence of developers using round number wall-clock times to start and end work sessions. The plot below shows (left) the number of work sessions starting at a given number of minutes past the hour, and (right) the number of work sessions ending at a given number of minutes past the hour; both for project 615 (code+data):
The arrow (green) shows the direction of the mean, and the almost invisible interior line shows that the length of the mean is almost zero. The five-minute points have slightly more session starts/ends than the surrounding minute values, but are more like bumps than spikes. The start of the hour, and 30-minutes, have prominent spikes, which might be caused by the start/end of the working day, and start/end of the lunch break.
Five-minutes is a convenient small rounding interval to either expand implementation time, or to target as a completion time. The following plot shows, for each of the 47 individuals working on project 615, the number of actual session times and the number exactly divisible by five. The green line shows the case where every actual is divisible by five, the purple line where 20% are divisible by five (expected for unbiased timing), the dashed purple lines show one standard deviation, the blue/green line is a fitted regression model () (code+data):
It appears that on average, five-minute session times occur twice as often as expected by chance; two individuals round all their actual session times (ok, it’s not that unlikely for the person with just two sessions).
Does it matter that some developers have a preference for using round numbers when recording time worked?
The use of round numbers in the recording of actual work sessions will inflate the total actual time for most tasks (because most tasks involve more than one session, and assuming that most rounding is not caused by developers striving to meet a target). The amount of error introduced is probably a lot less than the time variability caused by other implementation factors (I have yet to do the calculation).
I see the use of round numbers as a means of unpicking developer work habits.
Given the difficulty of getting developers to record anything, requiring them to record to minute-level accuracy appears at best optimistic. Would you work for a manager that required this level of effort detail (I know there is existing practice in other kinds of jobs)?
What can be learned from studying long gone development practices?
Current ideas about the best way of building a software system are heavily influenced by the ideas that captured the attention of previous generations of developers. Can anything of practical use be learned from studying long gone techniques for building software systems?
During the writing of my software engineering book, I was spending a lot of time researching the development techniques used during the twentieth century, and one day I suddenly realised that this was a waste of time. While early software developers tend to be eulogized today, the reality is that they were mostly people who had little idea what they were doing, who through personal competence of being in the right place at the right time managed to produce something good enough. On the whole, twentieth century software development techniques are only of historical interest. Yes, some timeless development principles were discovered, and these can be integrated into today’s techniques (which may also turn out to be of their-time).
My experience of software development in the late 1970s and 1980s is that there was rarely any connection between what management told the world about the development process, and how those reporting to the manager actually did the development.
If you are a manager in a world where software development is still very new, and you are given the job of managing the development of a software system, how do you go about it? A common approach is to apply the techniques that are already being used to run the manager’s organization. On a regular basis, managers came up with the idea of applying techniques from the science of industrial production (which is still happening today).
In the 1970s and 1980s there were usually very visible job hierarchies, and sharply defined roles. Organizations tended to use their existing job hierarchies and roles to create the structure for their software development employees. For years after I started work as a graduate, managers and secretaries were surprised to see me typing; secretaries typed, men did not type, and women developers fumed when they were treated like secretaries (because they had been seen typing).
The manual workers performed data entry, operated the computer (e.g., mounted tapes, and looked after the printer). The junior staff often started with the job title programmer, or perhaps junior programmer and there might be senior programmers; on paper these people wrote the code to implement the functionality specified by a systems analyst (or just analyst, or business analyst, perhaps with added junior or senior). Analysts did not to write code and programmers only coded what the specification they were given, at least according to management.
Pay level was set by the position in the job hierarchy, with those higher up earning more than those below them, and job titles/roles were also mapped to positions in the hierarchy. This created, in theory, a direct correspondence between pay and job title/role. In practice, organizations wanted to keep their productive employees, and so were flexible about the correspondence between pay and title, e.g., during their annual review some people were more interested in the status provided by a job title, while others wanted more money and did not care about job titles. Add into this mix the fact that pay/title levels rarely matched up between organizations, it soon became obvious to all that software job titles were a charade.
How should the people at the sharp end go about building a software system?
Structured programming was the widely cited technique in the 1970s. Consultants promoted their own variants, with Jackson structured programming being widely known in the UK, with regular courses and consultants offering to train staff. Today, structured programming appears remarkably simplistic, great for writing tiny programs (it has an academic pedigree), but not for anything larger than a thousand lines. Part of its appeal may have been this simplicity, many programs were small (because computer memory was measured in kilobytes) and management often thought that problems were simple (a recurring problem). There were a few adaptations that tried to address larger scale issues, e.g., Warnier/Orr structured programming.
The military were major employers of software developers in the 1960s and 1970s. In the US Work Breakdown Structure was mandated by the DOD for project development (for all projects, not just software), and in the UK we had MASCOT. These mandated development methodologies were created by committees, and have not been experimentally tested to be better/worse than any other approach.
I think the best management technique for successfully developing a software system in the 1970s and 1980s (and perhaps in the following decades), is based on being lucky enough to have a few very capable people, and then providing them with what is needed to get the job done while maintaining the fiction to upper management that the agreed bureaucratic plan is being followed.
There is one technique for producing a software system that rarely gets mentioned: keep paying for development until something good enough is delivered. Given the life-or-death need an organization might have for some software systems, paying what it takes may well have been a prevalent methodology during the early days of major software development.
To answer the question posed at the start of this post. What might be learned from a study of early software development techniques is the need for management to have lots of luck and to be flexible; funding is easier to obtain when managing a life-or-death project.
2021 in the programming language standards’ world
Last Tuesday I was on a Webex call (the British Standards Institute’s use of Webex for conference calls predates COVID 19) for a meeting of IST/5, the committee responsible for programming language standards in the UK.
There have been two developments whose effect, I think, will be to hasten the decline of the relevance of ISO standards in the programming language world (to the point that they are ignored by compiler vendors).
- People have been talking about switching to online meetings for years, and every now and again someone has dialed-in to the conference call phone system provided by conference organizers. COVID has made online meetings the norm (language working groups have replaced face-to-face meetings with online meetings). People are looking forward to having face-to-face meetings again, but there is talk of online attendance playing a much larger role in the future.
The cost of attending a meeting in person is the perennial reason given for people not playing an active role in language standards (and I imagine other standards). Online attendance significantly reduces the cost, and an increase in the number of people ‘attending’ meetings is to be expected if committees agree to significant online attendance.
While many people think that making it possible for more people to be involved, by reducing the cost, is a good idea, I think it is a bad idea. The rationale for the creation of standards is economic; customer costs are reduced by reducing
diversityincompatibilities across the same kind of product., e.g., all standard conforming compilers are consistent in their handling of the same construct (undefined behavior may be consistently different). When attending meetings is costly, those with a significant economic interest tend to form the bulk of those attending meetings. Every now and again somebody turns up for a drive-by-shooting, i.e., they turn up for a day to present a paper on their pet issue and are never seen again.Lowering the barrier to entry (i.e., cost) is going to increase the number of drive-by shootings. The cost of this spray of pet-issue papers falls on the regular attendees, who will have to spend time dealing with enthusiastic, single issue, newbies,
- The International Organization for Standardization (ISO is the abbreviation of the French title) has embraced the use of inclusive terminology. The ISO directives specifying the Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents, have been updated by the addition of a new clause: 8.6 Inclusive terminology, which says:
“Whenever possible, inclusive terminology shall be used to describe technical capabilities and relationships. Insensitive, archaic and non-inclusive terms shall be avoided. For the purposes of this principle, “inclusive terminology” means terminology perceived or likely to be perceived as welcoming by everyone, regardless of their sex, gender, race, colour, religion, etc.
New documents shall be developed using inclusive terminology. As feasible, existing and legacy documents shall be updated to identify and replace non-inclusive terms with alternatives that are more descriptive and tailored to the technical capability or relationship.”
The US Standards body, has released the document INCITS inclusive terminology guidelines. Section 5 covers identifying negative terms, and Section 6 deals with “Migration from terms with negative connotations”. Annex A provides examples of terms with negative connotations, preceded by text in bright red “CONTENT WARNING: The following list contains material that may be harmful or
traumatizing to some audiences.”“Error” sounds like a very negative word to me, but it’s not in the annex. One of the words listed in the annex is “dummy”. One member pointed out that ‘dummy’ appears 794 times in the current Fortran standard, (586 times in ‘dummy argument’).
Replacing words with negative connotations leads to frustration and distorted perceptions of what is being communicated.
I think there will be zero real world impact from the use of inclusive terminology in ISO standards, for the simple reason that terminology in ISO standards usually has zero real world impact (based on my experience of the use of terminology in ISO language standards). But the use of inclusive terminology does provide a new opportunity for virtue signalling by members of standards’ committees.
While use of inclusive terminology in ISO standards is unlikely to have any real world impact, the need to deal with suggested changes of terminology, and new terminology, will consume committee time. Most committee members tend to a rather pragmatic, but it only takes one or two people to keep a discussion going and going.
Over time, compiler vendors are going to become disenchanted with the increased workload, and the endless discussions relating to pet-issues and inclusive terminology. Given that there are so few industrial strength compilers for any language, the world no longer needs formally agreed language standards; the behavior that implementations have to support is controlled by the huge volume of existing code. Eventually, compiler vendors will sever the cord to the ISO standards process, and outside the SC22 bubble nobody will notice.
Estimating using a granular sequence of values
When asked for an estimate of the time needed to complete a task, should developers be free to choose any numeric value, or should they be restricted to selecting from a predefined set of values (e.g, the Fibonacci numbers, or T-shirt sizes)?
Allowing any value to be chosen would appear to provide the greatest flexibility to make an accurate estimate. However, estimating is an intrinsically uncertain process (i.e., the future is unknown), and it is done by people with varying degrees of experience (which might be used to help guide their prediction about the future).
Restricting the selection process to one of the values in a granular sequence of numbers has several benefits, including:
- being able to adjust the gaps between permitted values to match the likely level of uncertainty in the task effort, or the best accuracy resolution believed possible,
- reducing the psychological stress of making an estimate, by explicitly giving permission to ignore the smaller issues (because they are believed to require a total effort that is less than the sequence granularity),
- helping to maintain developer self-esteem, by providing a justification when an estimate turning out to be inaccurate, e.g., the granularity prevented a more accurate estimate being made.
Is there an optimal sequence of granular values to use when making task estimates for a project?
The answer to this question depends on what is attempting to be optimized.
Given how hard it is to get people to produce estimates, the first criterion for an optimal sequence has to be that people are willing to use it.
I have always been struck by the ritualistic way in which the Fibonacci sequence is described by those who use it to make estimates. Rituals are an effective technique used by groups to help maintain members’ adherence to group norms (one of which might be producing estimates).
A possible reason for the tendency to use round numbers might estimate-values is that this usage is common in other social interactions involving numeric values, e.g., when replying to a request for the time of day.
The use of round numbers, when developers have the option of selecting from a continuous range of values, is a developer imposed granular sequence. What form do these round number sequences take?
The plot below shows the values of each of the six most common round number estimates present in the BrightSquid, SiP, and CESAW (project 615) effort estimation data sets, plus the first six Fibonacci numbers (code+data):
The lines are fitted regression models having the form: (there is a small variation in the value of the constant; the smallest value for project 615 was probably calculated rather than being human selected).
This plot shows a consistent pattern of use across multiple projects (I know of several projects that use Fibonacci numbers, but don’t have any publicly available data). Nothing is said about this pattern being (near) optimal in any sense.
The time unit of estimation for this data was minutes or hours. Would the equation have the same form if the time unit was days, would the constant still be around . I await the data needed to answer this question.
This brief analysis looked at granular sequences from the perspective of the distribution of estimates made. Perhaps it makes more sense to base a granular estimation sequence on the distribution of actual task effort. A topic for another post.
What is known about software effort estimation in 2021
What do we know about software effort estimation, based on evidence?
The few publicly available datasets (e.g., SiP, CESAW, and Renzo) involve (mostly) individuals estimating short duration tasks (i.e., rarely more than a few hours). There are other tiny datasets, which are mostly used to do fake research. The patterns found across these datasets include:
- developers often use round-numbers,
- the equation: , where is a constant that varies between projects, often explains around 50% of the variance present in the data. This equation shows that developers under-estimate short tasks and over-estimate long tasks. The exponent, , applies across most projects in the data,
- individuals tend to either consistently over or under estimate,
- developer estimation accuracy does not change with practice. Possible reasons for this include: variability in the world prevents more accurate estimates, developers choose to spend their learning resources on other topics.
Does social loafing have an impact on actual effort? The data needed to answer this question is currently not available (the available data mostly involves people working on their own).
When working on a task, do developers follow Parkinson’s law or do they strive to meet targets?
The following plot suggests that one or the other, or both are true (data):
On the left: Each colored lines shows the number of tasks having a given actual implementation time, when they were estimated to take 30, 60 or 120 minutes (the right plot reverses the role of estimate/actual). Many of the spikes in the task counts are at round numbers, suggesting that the developer has fixated on a time to finish and is either taking it easy or striving to hit it. The problem is distinguishing them mathematically; suggestions welcome.
None of these patterns of behavior appear to be software specific. They all look like generic human behaviors. I have started emailing researchers working on project analytics in other domains, asking for data (no luck so far).
Other patterns may be present for many projects in the existing data, we have to wait for somebody to ask the right question (if one exists).
It is also possible that the existing data has some unusual characteristics that don’t apply to most projects. We won’t know until data on many more projects becomes available.
Production of software may continue to be craft based
Andrew Carnegie made his fortune in the steel industry, and his autobiography is a fascinating insight into the scientific vs. craft/folklore approach to smelting iron ore. Carnegie measured the processes involved in smelting; he tracked the input and outputs involved in the smelting process, and applied the newly available scientific knowledge (e.g., chemistry) to minimize the resources needed to extract iron from ore. Other companies continued to treat Iron smelting as a suck-it-and-see activity, driven by personal opinion and the application of techniques that had worked in the past.
The technique of using what-worked-last-time can be a successful strategy when the variability of the inputs is low. In the case of smelting Iron there was a lot of variability in the Iron ore, Limestone and Coke fed into the furnaces. The smelting companies in Carnegie’s day ‘solved’ this input variability problem by restricting their purchase of raw materials to mines that delivered material that worked last time.
Hiring an experienced chemist (the only smelting company to do so), Carnegie found out that the quality of ore (i.e., percentage Iron content) in some mines with a high reputation was much lower than the ore quality of some mines with a low reputation; Carnegie was able to obtain a low price for high quality ore because other companies did not appreciate its characteristics (and shunned using it). Other companies were unable to extract Iron from high quality ore because they stuck to using a process that worked for lower quality ore (the amount of Limestone and Coke added to the smelting process has to be adjusted based on the Iron content of the ore, otherwise the process may deliver poor results, or even fail to produce Iron; see chapter 13).
When Carnegie’s application of scientific knowledge, and his competitors’ opinion driven production, is combined with being a good businessman, it’s no surprise that Carnegie made a fortune from his Iron smelting business.
What are the parallels between iron smelting in Carnegie’s day and the software industry?
An obvious parallel is the industry dominance of opinion driven processes. But then, the lack of any scientific basis for the processes involved in building software systems would seem to make drawing parallels a pointless exercise.
Let’s assume that there was a scientific basis for some of the major processes involved in software engineering. Would any of these science-based processes be adopted?
The reason for using science based knowledge and mechanization is to reduce costs, which may lead to increased profits or just staying in business (in a Red Queen’s race).
Agriculture is an example of a business where science and mechanization dominate, and building construction is a domain where this has not happened. Perhaps building construction will become more mechanized when unknown missing components become available (mechanization was available for agricultural processes in the 1700s, but they did not spread for a century or two, e.g., threshing machines).
It’s possible to find parallels between software engineering and the smelting process, agriculture, and building construction. In fact, it parallels can probably be found between software engineering and any other major business domain.
Drawing parallels between software engineering and other major business domains creates a sense of familiarity. In practice, software is unlike most existing business domains in that software products are one-off creations of an intangible good, which has (virtually) zero cost of reproduction, while the economics of creating tangible goods (e.g., by smelting, sowing and reaping, or building houses) is all about reducing the far from zero cost of reproduction.
Perhaps the main take-away from the history of the production of tangible goods is that the scientific method has not always supplanted the craft approach to production.
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